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Lobbying the European Parliament: Identifying Changing 
Trends Post-Treaty of Lisbon 
 
Jason Means1 




This study evaluates the assumption that lobbying at the EP level steadily 
increased after the Treaty of Lisbon, and also the expectation that there would 
be no variation in lobbying activity (measured by types of lobbyists) during this 
period. Research was conducted through the utilization of data from the 
European Transparency Register as scraped by Friedrich Lindenberg between 
2012 and 2014. After categorizing more than 16,000 entries it was determined 
that the amount of lobbyists targeting the EU has steadily increased, and the 
primary lobbying group between the researched period was Business—though, 
there was a significant amount of variation between the types of lobbying 
groups, with NGOs coming in second. This is indicative of citizens becoming 
more involved in EU affairs as the deepening of integration and the expansion 




 Several scholars have noted the absence of literature on EU lobbying, and the 
majority of research to date has focused on the role of interest groups lobbying the 
European Commission before 2009. After the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
researchers from several disciplines noted the likelihood of increased lobbying of the 
European Parliament (EP), observing a shift in competencies and the increased role 
                                                
1 A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of 
Arts with Honors in Political Science. Many thanks to Dr. Yeşilada, Dr. Williams, Melissa, 
Joel, and the Hatfield School of Government.  
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of the Parliament in the EU’s legislative process. Though, problems of transparency 
and access have hindered the comprehensive, longitudinal data needed to quantify 
the Treaty of Lisbon’s true effects on lobbying the EP.2 With regard to Brandsma 
(2013)3, Hauser (2011)4, and Cirone (2011)5, this paper seeks to explore the reasons 
why interest groups would be more likely to lobby the European Parliament after the 
Treaty of Lisbon, identify whether an increase has actually occurred, and then gauge 
which interest groups have chosen to lobby the EP. As the term lobbying is frequently 
used throughout this paper, it is important to clarify how it will be used within the 
framework of this study: Lobbying refers to the influencing of legislative or 
administrative decisions made by public officials through the use of interest group 
representatives.6 
 Section 2 will provide a historical overview of the changing structure of the 
European Parliament in order to provide a contextual background necessary in 
understanding the reasons behind the EP’s post-Lisbon makeup.  
 Section 3 will critically review the theories of the aforementioned scholars in 
determining the potential reasons why an interest group would be more likely to 
                                                
2 Henry Hauser, “European Union Lobbying Post-Lisbon,” in Berkeley Journal of 
International Law, vol. 29, 2011, 697 
3 Gijs Jan Brandsma, “Bending The Rules: Arrangements for Sharing Technical and 
Political Information between the EU Institutions,” in European Integration online Papers 
(EloP), vol. 17 (Special Issue 1), 1-22 
4 Ibid. 
5 Alexandra Cirone, “Patterns of Interest Group Lobbying at the EU,” Columbia University, 
2011, 1-27  
6 Peter Koeppl, The Acceptance, Relevance and Dominance of Lobbying in the EU 
Commission (London: Henry Stewart Publications, 2001), in Hauser, 682 
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target the European Parliament when choosing which EU institution to lobby. The 
Treaty of Lisbon has brought many changes to the EU’s institutional structure, 
including an increased demand for access to technical information, causing MEPs to 
rely on lobbyist support.7 On the lobbyist’s side of the table, targeting the EP has been 
posited to be more efficient and cost-effective due to the use of party groups as 
information shortcuts.8  
 The perceived benefits of targeting the EP contains a sense of dissonance when 
considering traditional views on EU lobbying. Past literature has noted the tendency 
for interest groups to target the European Commission in an attempt to shift EU 
policy, considering that the Commission is the only European institution with the 
right to initiate legislation.9 Regardless, it is apparent that the EP has become a 
viable venue for lobbyists.10 The EP is considered to be especially favorable for those 
representing NGOs and other groups that champion public interest issues—MEPs, 
as directly elected representatives of the European public, are very invested in topics 
of relevance to their constituents.11 
 In considering the complex inter-institutional relationships of the European 
Union, technical information is not the only important type of knowledge required to 
                                                
7 Hauser, 698; Brandsma, 4 
8 Hauser, 703; Léa Roger and Thomas Winzen, “Party Groups and Committee Negotiations 
in the European Parliament: Outside Attention and the Anticipation of Plenary Conflict,” in 
Journal of European Public Policy, Vol. 22, Issue 3, 2015, 391-408 
9 Cirone, 2 and 5 
10 Ibid., 2 
11 Cirone, 7 
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navigate the legislative arena. Brandsma argues that both technical and political 
information are imperative and dictate the strategy institutions adopt in order to 
push legislation forward.12 He even argues that political information is the subject of 
most, if not all, inter-institutional arrangements, which indicates that MEPs most 
rely on interest groups for their technical information. What is uncertain, however, 
is whether this reliance on lobbying truly affects the legislative process—the 
European Parliament is but one arm of the European Union’s legislative body. 
 Section 4 will provide a detailed explanation of the methods utilized in 
determining whether lobbyists have increasingly targeted the EP since the 
ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. Though data was unavailable immediately 
following 2009, thanks to Friedrich Lindenberg and the joint LobbyFacts project at 
the Corporate Europe Observatory and LobbyControl, this study has utilized data on 
persons accredited to lobby the EP from 2012 to 2014. 
 Afterwards, the aforementioned data will be analyzed to determine a) whether 
there has indeed been an increase of individuals lobbying the European Parliament 
since the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon and b) which organizations have chosen 
to do so.13 The remainder of the paper will re-visit the framework through which this 
study has been conducted in order to glean potential explanations for these changing 
trends within the EU. 
                                                
12 Brandsma, 5 
13 Previous data suggests that NGOs and other groups representing the public interest have 
chosen to target the European Parliament over the Commission, therefore this study will 
check whether this is still the case. See Cirone (2011). 
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2. Background 
“The existence of a parliament does not by itself create a stronger bond between the 
public and politics. To fulfil its mediating function, a parliament must establish a 
meaningful relationship with both the people and the government.”14 
 The European Parliament was first established in 1952 as the Common 
Assembly (CA) and belonged to the EU’s nascent form, The European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC).15 The CA was initially criticized as being nothing more than a 
“democratic window-dresser and talking shop” due to its inability to influence the 
policy-making process.16 However, its creation was of importance to the founding 
member states—the High Authority (HA; executive) of the ECSC was unelected, 
consequently creating a democratic deficit. In a domestic context, the rational 
response to such a deficit would be to legitimize executive authority through the 
creation of a representative parliamentary assembly—all of the ECSC’s founding 
states were parliamentary democracies—however, this was the first time that such a 
feat had been attempted on a supranational scale.17 Member states were conflicted 
on what form this body would take: German representatives preferred a federalist 
approach—i.e., a strong parliament with real legislative and budgetary powers; 
French representatives were somewhat skeptical of federalism and preferred (at 
                                                
14 Luuk Van Middelaar, The Passage to Europe: How a Continent Became a Union (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2013), 275 
15 Michelle Cini and Nieves Borragan, European Union Politics (Oxford University Press, 
2013), 161 
16 Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe’s Parliament: Democratic Representation Beyond 
the Nation-State (Oxford University Press, 2005), 74  
17 Ibid., 98 
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least, initially) a largely unconstrained HA; Representatives from the Benelux states 
argued that a parliamentary assembly would be incapable of defending certain 
aspects of national sovereignty.18 It was concluded that the CA would be granted the 
ability to dismiss the HA and its 78 members would be appointed from national 
parliaments (thereby providing an indirect yet democratic link between ordinary 
citizens and European elites).19 Though seemingly minuscule, this first acquisition of 
power set the stage for the CA to seek out and successfully obtain more influence on 
the basis of strengthening the EU’s legitimacy.  
 As illustrated by Table A (see below), in its 64 years of existence the European 
Parliament has transitioned from having little authority to being on par with its 
fellow institutions, having acquired more rights and responsibilities with every 
treaty. Most noteworthy are the EP’s legislative and budgetary powers. As a function 
of Ordinary Legislative Procedure (OLP), the EP (with the Council) maintains 
legislative authority over more than 80 policy areas.20 This has allowed for more 
inclusion of human rights issues in European affairs, given that the EP is subject to 
public scrutiny and is therefore tasked with representing ordinary citizens—it has 
amended legislation to improve standards on air and water quality, increased 
                                                
18 Ibid., 100-101 
19 Cini and Borragan, 160-161 
20 Ibid., 163 
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consumer protection, and has championed initiatives that promote the fair treatment 
of workers.21 
Table A: Critical Junctures in EP History22 
 
 
Before the Treaty of Lisbon, there was a distinction between the EU’s 
compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure; the EP could only amend the latter, 
thereby limiting the scope of its influence. Now that this distinction has been 
repealed, the EP enjoys full access to the EU’s budget, and, in tandem with the 
                                                
21 Ibid., 164 
22 Table inspired by Cini and Borragan, 161 
Year Event Parliamentary Powers 




Treaty of Brussels 
Limited right to amend and approve community budget; 
right to reject community budget  
1979 First Direct Elections MEPs transitioned from national parliamentarians to separately elected officials 
1987 Single European Act (SEA) Cooperation with Council in legislative affairs 
1993 Treaty of Maastricht Granted the right of Co-Decision; Right to approve or reject Commission nominations 
1999 Treaty of Amsterdam Increased rights within Co-Decision; Right to formally veto Commission President nomination 
2003 Treaty of Nice Extended rights within Co-Decision 
2009 Treaty of Lisbon 
Granted equal budgetary status with the Council; 
Granted equal legislative status with the Council (Co-
Decision transition to Ordinary Legislative Procedure 
(OLP); Right to request treaty changes; (Contested) right 
to elect Commission President 
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Council, has the ability to amend the budget across all areas within the budgetary 
realm.23 
Further changes brought upon by the Treaty of Lisbon have created additional 
avenues for citizens to engage with both the EP and the Commission: The EP has 
instantiated its power and relevance by tying in Commission presidential candidates 
with parliamentary elections—the adoption of Spitzenkandidaten helped to further 
politicize the Commission in an attempt to convince voters that the EP’s electoral 
process was more meaningful than ever before.24 
This attempt, however, appears to have been in vain. The difference in voter 
turnout between 2009 and 2014 was less than 1%, continuing the narrative of more 
power, less interest. 25  Despite these failed attempts at cultivating democratic 
legitimacy, the European Parliament has indeed made significant power gains since 
its creation, and is therefore likely to be more of a target for interest groups.  
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 The previous section establishes that the EP has achieved significant power 
gains since its creation, but how does this equate to an increase in being targeted by 
                                                
23 Hauser, 9 
24 “Spitzenkandidaten: the story of what made last year’s European elections different,” 
European Parliament, last modified June 4, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/news-room/20150526STO59409/Spitzenkandidaten-
the-story-of-what-made-last-year's-EP-elections-different 
25 “Results of the 2014 European elections,” European Parliament, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-results/en/turnout.html 
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lobbyists? This section will explore past literature on the EP and lobbying as a means 
to set the stage for this paper’s key hypotheses. 
 
3.1 Information as Power 
 Brandsma identifies information as a key factor in determining whether 
legislative initiatives are successful. 26  Drawing from Sabatier (1978), Brandsma 
divides information into two categories: technical and political. 27  Technical 
information is expertise based on empirical knowledge, and can be used in assessing 
the costs and benefits of a particular legislative initiative with regards to its content. 
Brandsma further divides technical information into two subcategories: exogenous 
and endogenous expertise.28 Exogenous expertise refers to the technical information 
already known to an individual or group before working on a certain policy, while 
endogenous expertise refers to technical information that is learned on the job.29 
Whereas technical information focuses on content, political information is centered 
on power and interests—specifically, information about other actors’ policy 
preferences. 3031  Both forms of information are important to all of the EU’s 
                                                
26 3 
27 P. Sabatier, The Acquisition and Utilization of Technical Information by Administrative 
Agencies (Administrative Science Quarterly, vol. 23, 1978) in Brandsma, 4   
28 Ibid., 4 
29 Sean Gailmard, Expertise, Subversion, and Bureaucratic Discretion (Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organization, vol. 18, issue 2, 2002), 536-555, in Brandsma 4  
30 Ibid., 4 
31 Brandsma uses the amount of resources spent on obtaining information about a 
particular policy as an indicator of the amount of interest an institution has. 
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institutions, considering that technical information is imperative in creating sound 
policies and political information is key to “winning” favorable policies throughout 
the legislative process. 32  Brandsma finds that most formal and informal inter-
institutional relationships are built on the acquisition of political information, and 
that the EP is the primary benefactor of these relationships33, subsequently leaving 
the need for technical information—specifically exogenous expertise—unsatisfied. 
 
3.2 Supply and Demand: Interest Groups and the European Parliament 
 Exogenous expertise is particularly important to the EP due to the immense 
expansion of its competencies brought upon by the Treaty of Lisbon. As previously 
mentioned, the EP now acts as a bicameral legislator and has access to over 80 policy 
areas. This has effectively “exacerbated the strain on its institutional resources” and 
“[compelled] policymakers to rely more heavily on lobbyists for technical information 
and representative input.” 34  Put simply, the expansion of the Parliament’s 
competencies has created a demand for more technical information and a subsequent 
supply of lobbyists to provide that information. Though Hauser’s primary focus was 
on the Council, this paper operates under the assumption that his theories of supply 
and demand in a European context readily apply to the European Parliament when 
combined with Ringe’s theory of perceived preference coherence.  
                                                
32 Ibid., 5 
33 Ibid., 19 
34 Hauser, 681 
LOBBYING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
   
11 
 Hauser’s focus on the Council stems from the Treaty of Lisbon’s extension of 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to many new policy areas and the introduction of 
double majority voting. 35  He predicted that the newest Treaty would provide 
businesses with fewer lobbying expenses and greater access to legislators:    
“the expansion of QMV under Lisbon may increase the utility a business expects      
to gain by spending an additional dollar on lobbying by enabling firms to obtain 
favorable regulations despite securing less access to EU policymakers.”36 
Similar logic can be applied to the EP when the extension of QMV is replaced with 
the tendency of MEPs to compensate for their lack of exogenous information by 
adopting the policy preferences of their party colleagues (i.e., perceived preference 
coherence).37 In fact, it is perhaps more effective to focus on the EP instead of the 
Council in this sense as the Council is made up of national representatives and is 
therefore often not the chosen venue for lobbyists.38 In a traditional parliamentary 
system, especially one that utilizes a closed-list PR electoral system, MPs adhere to 
their party’s platform due to strong party leadership, however, MEPs are not in 
danger of the usual sanctions (e.g. barring an MEP from reelection) because EP 
candidate lists are chosen by national party delegations.39 Instead, party cohesion is 
created by the positive benefits associated with the sharing of information between 
                                                
35 Hauser, 688 
36 Ibid., 703 
37 Nils Ringe, “Perceived Preference Coherence in Legislative Politics,” in Who Decides, and 
How? (Oxford University Press, 2010), 25-44 
38 Cini and Borragan, 185 
39 Ibid., 5 
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MEPs. This can make up for the lack of technical information prevalent throughout 
the European Parliament and also streamline the legislative process. 
 Perceived preference coherence is significant for lobbying, because, similar to 
Hauser’s QMV-Council prediction, the technical information that lobbyists provide 
has a greater chance of reaching more MEPs at less cost to interest groups. When 
MEPs receive exogenous information that is particularly helpful in assessing whether 
a particular policy matches their political preferences, according to Ringe these MEPs 
are likely to share this information with their colleagues; thus, this utility creates an 
incentive for interest groups to focus on lobbying the European Parliament. 
 
3.3 Europeans and their Parliament 
As EU integration further deepens to include issues that affect all Europeans, 
it is unsurprising that there are now several examples of citizens’ organizations 
getting involved in European affairs. In addition to the Parliament’s attempts at 
engaging citizens, the Commission has created an avenue for ordinary Europeans to 
get involved—The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI). Beginning in April 2012, the 
ECI provides a legal avenue for European citizens to mobilize in order to convince the 
Commission to initiate particular legislation. 40  For a proposal to reach the 
Commission, it must receive one million signatures from at least one quarter of EU 
Member States. Then, by law, the Commission must decide whether it will act, and 
                                                
40 Birol Ali Yesilada. "Public Opinion and Participation in the European Union: EUSA 
Interest Section Papers.pdf" European Union Studies Association (2016), 5 
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then explain the reasons behind said decision.41 At the time of this paper there are 
currently four open initiatives: “Mum, Dad & Kids - European Citizens' Initiative to 
protect Marriage and Family,” “Wake up Europe! Taking action to safeguard the 
European democratic project,” “Stop Plastic in the Sea,” and “Fair Transport 
Europe.”42 While the ECI is not directly involved with the EP, it is nevertheless 
indicative of an increasingly engaged Europe. This is but one example of how citizens 
are increasingly transcending their involvement in domestic affairs to that of the 
supranational level. Perhaps because of this, Cirone’s research indicates that NGOs 
were more likely to lobby the Commission43. However, it is logical to assume that the 
number of NGOs and other groups championing citizens’ interests will increasingly 
target the European Parliament. With respect to Dur and de Bievre (2007) and 
Beyers (2008), Cirone herself cites that NGOs provide technical information about 
broad topics and issues that appeal to citizens, subsequently making them directly 
relevant to MEPs.44 With this in mind, it seems likely that, at the very least, the rate 




                                                
41 Ibid. 
42 “Open Initiatives,” last modified April 15, 2016, European Commission, 
http://ec.europa.eu/citizens-initiative/public/initiatives/open 
43 Cirone, 15 
44 Cirone, 7 
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3.4 Predictions 
 Utilizing the aforementioned theories and assumptions, it appears that the 
expansion of powers granted to the EP by the Treaty of Lisbon has given interest 
groups more reasons to lobby the EP and the EP more reasons to seek out lobbyists, 
thus creating a relatively reciprocal relationship. Subsequently, MEPs’ need for more 
technical information provides a logical explanation for a potential increase of 
lobbyists within the halls of Parliament. Additionally, these groups seem likely to be 
comprised of more NGOs and other groups representing citizens’ interests, as the EP 
is the only institution comprised of directly elected representatives and is therefore 
interested in maintaining access to issues that are relevant to public opinion. 
Therefore, this study operates on the following hypotheses: H1: As EU integration has 
deepened with each successive Treaty, lobbying at the EP is expected to steadily 
increase after 2009. H0: No significant variation in lobbying activity (measured by 
types of lobbyists) is expected as a result of the deepening of integration in the EU. 
 
4. Methods 
 Though there is currently a public register that displays those with 
accreditation to lobby the European Parliament, it lacks historical data and is mired 
by those also registered with the European Commission. In order to perform a cross-
sectional study, I relied on data collected by Friedrich Lindenberg (@pudo) who, 
among other projects, has devoted his resources towards data scraping the European 
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Parliament Transparency Register daily from 2012 to 2014.45 Lindenberg’s data is 
currently being used by two transparency projects, the open source 
http://openinterests.eu and http://lobbyfacts.eu, a joint endeavor  of Corporate Europe 
Observatory and LobbyControl.     
 I observed five datasets in total, covering 16,339 entries. Each dataset included 
information on those registered on a particular day to lobby the European 
Parliament. The five chosen datasets covered six month intervals, starting on March 
16, 2012 and ending on March 16, 2014. The focal point of each entry was the 
organization that the registered lobbyist represented—I coded each entry by cross 
referencing the organization with categories assigned by LobbyFacts and 
OpenInterests, and triple-checked the data by ascertaining an organization’s legal 
status on their website when necessary. The data was categorized in five different 
ways: Business, Professional Consultancy, Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), 
Research Institution, and Government Organization.  
 Organizations were categorized as Business if they represented the interests 
of a particular sector (e.g. Trade, Agriculture, Finance, etc.) and/or maintained a legal 
status indicative of a business.46 A tangible example of an organization coded as a 
business is “RENAULT,” a trucking company. Organizations that were labeled by 
LobbyFacts and/or OpenInterests as NGOs or Professional Consultancies were coded 
                                                
45 This data is accessible on Lindenberg’s website: data.pudo.com/eu 
46 Dependent upon legal requirements in particular countries, for example, a Limited 
Liability Company (LLC) is a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmbH) in Germany. 
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as such, respectively.47 Separating professional consultancies from businesses was an 
important distinction to make; as consultancies tend to represent multiple 
individuals or organizations in their lobbying efforts it is impossible to categorize 
them as anything else. Any organization that was labeled as representing “local, 
regional and municipal authorities, other public or mixed entities, etc.”48 was coded 
as Government Organization. Any organization devoted to research (e.g. universities, 
think tanks, other research institutions, etc.) was coded as Research Organization.49 
 After coding was completed, all five datasets were tallied by their individual 
categories and displayed to show the changing trends in the amount and type of 
lobbyists with EP accreditation from 2012-2014. In order to adequately assess 
whether H1 is correct, data on the amount of EP-accredited lobbyists from before or 
immediately after the Treaty of Lisbon needed to be used. Cirone’s research 
determined that in 2010 this number was approximately 1,880.50 
 
5. Results and Analysis 
There was an increase in the number of individuals with accreditation to lobby 
the European Parliament between 2012 and 2014 (See Fig. A). After a jump of 1,002 
registrations between March and September of 2012, the number of registrations 
                                                
47 Additionally, religious organizations were coded as NGOs. 
48 Particular wording used by LobbyFacts and OpenInterests 
49 The initial study was designed to code the fifth data category as Think Tank, however it 
quickly became apparent that there were more research-oriented organizations that were 
not solely think tanks. 
50 Cirone, 14 
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increased every six months by an average of 11.2 percent. The slight curve between 
September 2012 and March 2014 indicates more-than-average growth rates, though 
without further data it is impossible to assess whether it can be called exponential 
growth (Though it would seem spurious to claim that the relationship between Time 
as an independent variable and the Number of Accredited Lobbyists as a dependent 
variable is statistically significant). 
When separating the total number of interest group representatives into 
categories, it is clear that businesses represented the majority of groups lobbying the 
EP (See Fig. B) between 2012 and 2014. NGOs came in second place, ahead of 
professional consultancies, which may surprise the reader considering Cirone’s 
previous claims. Though, the average gap between the amount of NGOs and 
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businesses in this sample is 940. Noticeable in both Fig. A and Fig. B is the abrupt 
increase of the slope between March 16th and September 16th in 2012—this is due to 
a jump in registrations by those representing business interests. There is no 
immediately identifiable event in early September 2012 to explain such an event, 
nevertheless, a jump breaking the otherwise consistent slope occurred. Professional 
Consultancy came in third, closely behind NGOs, and Research Organization and 
Government Organization barely registered on the chart, fluctuating between fourth 
and fifth at an average of 94 and 81 registered lobbyists, respectively. Occasionally it 
was impossible to categorize an organization due to a multitude of reasons, ranging 
from not being included in the LobbyFacts and OpenInterests databases to an 
organization being extremely ambiguous about the nature of their legal status. These 







3/16/12 9/16/12 3/16/13 9/16/13 3/16/14
FIGURE	 B:	 INTEREST	GROUP	REPRESENTATIVES	WITH	
OFFICIAL	 EP	PASSES	BY	 TYPE	 (2012-2014)
Business Professional	Consultancy NGO Research	Organization Government	Organization
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 These results illustrate that H1 is correct; Cirone’s record of 1,880 individuals 
registered to lobby the EP had increased to 4,287 by March 16, 2014. Regarding H0, 
there is large variation in the amount each group has chosen to lobby the European 
Parliament: s2 for the above figure is more than 10 times that of x. It also appears 
that the rate by which each group has increased between 2012 and 2014 varies: 
Government Organization and Think Tank barely increased; Professional 
Consultancy’s growth slowed to roughly half its original rate after March 16, 2013; 
NGO dropped from 45% growth to 13% growth in the first year, but slowly increased 
to 27% growth in the final sample; and Business, aside from the aforementioned 
jump, maintained an almost consistent growth rate to match that of the total number 
of registered lobbyists (in the months between the last two samples, the number of 
registered lobbyists representing businesses grew by 12.8%). Therefore, we may 
reject the null hypothesis that there was no significant variation in lobbying activity 
(measured by types of lobbyists)—there was significant variation, which may be the 
result of the deepening of integration in the EU. 
 It is unsurprising that Business was (and is likely to still be) the primary group 
lobbying Parliament. Even at its inception, economic integration across Member 
states has been more palatable than political integration. It is, however, notable that 
the rate at which business lobbied Parliament was barely affected by the global 
economic crisis and subsequent Great Recession. This is likely due to the theories laid 
out by Brandsma, Hauser, and their colleagues—large businesses have the capital to 
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research topics of importance to themselves and MEPs (i.e. access to technical 
information); vis-à-vis perceived preference coherence, this research may be passed 
on to other MEPs with little to no added expense to businesses. These avenues may 
also be adopted by NGOs, especially considering that they represent public interests 
and are therefore integral to the European legislative process; nevertheless, NGOs 
lobby on a smaller scale than businesses. 
 
5. Limitations and Future Research 
 There were several limitations to this study, the first being that the data used 
did not cover the period immediately after the Treaty of Lisbon. Though my results 
do suggest that H1 is correct and H0 is incorrect, the data would be more robust if it 
covered interest groups with EP passes in six month intervals beginning in 2010 and 
ending more recently, ideally in 2016.  
 Additionally, though the way in which Business was classified generally 
followed suit with Cirone’s methodological set up and the classifications used by 
LobbyFacts and OpenInterests, it is ideologically questionable and may have skewed 
the data. This is due to this study’s inclusion of interest groups representing trade 
unions. Trade unions should not have been included in the Business category because 
they aren’t inherently representing the interests of businesses—instead, they 
represent the rights and interests of their particular constituencies, namely, workers. 
It would be valuable to replicate the previous study while isolating trade unions as a 
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separate control variable to assess whether the results would still place Business as 
the primary group lobbying the EP. 
Though this study’s results do indicate that NGOs are taking advantage of the 
Parliament’s increased powers, these NGOs are greatly outnumbered by Business 
interests; as the deepening of EU integration continues to affect ordinary citizens’ 
lives, though, it will be pertinent to identify whether NGOs will ever surpass 
businesses in their future lobbying endeavors. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 This study attempted to show the changing trends in lobbying within the 
European Union, with particular focus on interest groups that have chosen to lobby 
the European Parliament. By providing historical context, it was established that the 
EP has experienced a significant growth in power and responsibility over the last 64 
years, and as the solely elected body of the EU, MEPs are tasked to represent the 
interests of their constituents. Afterwards, the theories of Brandsma, Hauser, Cirone, 
and their colleagues were discussed in order to lay the groundwork for this study’s 
hypothesis and null hypothesis—through coding more than 16,000 data entries 
covering a period of two years, it was determined that the rate of lobbyists targeting 
the EP has indeed increased and indicates continual growth; it was also determined 
that there is a large amount of variation in the types of groups that choose to lobby 
the EP. Though businesses are the overall lobbying “champions” in terms of sheer 
numbers, it is logical to posit that the increasing number of NGOs involving 
LOBBYING THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
   
22 
themselves in EP lobbying is indicative of an ever-closer European Union. The Treaty 
of Lisbon, as an answer to the call for more citizen involvement, has been yet another 
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